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THE CHALLENGE OF ARSON 
  
In the UK it is estimated that the direct financial costs of arson are well over £1.3 
billion a year.  If the value of investigation time, uninsured losses and total social 
costs were included then the real cost is considerably higher (Home Office 1999). 
Arson fires often devastate whole families. Injuries can leave the victims with a 
lifetime of pain as well as permanent physical and mental scars. The outcome of 
widespread arson in a community can create degeneration within an area, provoking a 
loss of business and unemployment.  
 
Reducing arson, both as it relates to crime and as it relates to death, injury and 
damage is therefore an important component of the stated Government aim of creating 
safer communities.   But in order for effective government strategies to be developed 
for dealing with arson its nature and extent need to be fully understood.  Yet although 
dictionaries make clear that Arson is the intentional or reckless setting fire to property 
for some improper reason, in practice it can take on many different meanings and the 
estimates of its occurrence can vary enormously.  
 
These variations are highlighted when the number of malicious fires recorded by the 
fire service is compared with those recorded by the police. In 1999 the fire service 
recorded 102,900 malicious fires and the police 53,800.  This 100 percent difference 
is due to different definitions, recording processes and record keeping practices.  
 
It is therefore clear that arson is of considerable importance but that its nature and 
extent needs to be carefully reviewed in order to lay the groundwork for future 
government policy.  The following report therefore sets out to identify: 
 
a) The types of arson that occur, 
b) Estimates of the proportions of each of these types  
c) The nature of the difficulties inherent in tackling arson, 
d) Proposals of forms of intervention for the different types identified, 
e) Future directions for projects that will help to reduce arson further. 
 
 
Arson and Arsonists: An Approach to the study of malicious fires 
 
In the examination of arson with a view to developing interventions for its reduction 
an important but complicating factor needs to be recognised.  Arson can be dealt with 
both by interventions with people who intend to or do commit arson and it can be 
dealt with by protecting, or „hardening‟, the potential target of arson.  This distinction 
between the person who causes the arson and the target that suffers it has wide 
ranging policy implications because, in general, different agencies are concerned and 
able to deal with the arsonists to those that deal with the targets. This is illustrated 
most directly in the fact that in the past the police concern with arson was to identify 
and prosecute the perpetrator whilst the mission of the fire service focused on the 
possible and actual consequences of arson, dealing with the targets attacked. 
Therefore for any strategies for dealing with arson to be effective they must 
incorporate both aspects of arson, perpetrators and targets, into a coherent framework 
on which interventions may be built. 
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Classification as a Starting Point 
 
The first stage in developing a coherent strategy for dealing with arson is to identify 
the various forms of arson and arsonists.  There are a variety of ways in which 
individuals and their actions can be classified. Psychologists have debated for over a 
century the most appropriate ways to carry out such classifications.  In general it is 
recognised that assigning individuals to one of a few „types‟ is likely to be very crude 
and that any such classification process can only be approximate. Not every 
individual can be clearly assigned to just one type. However, in order to develop a 
strategy for dealing with arson some attempt must be made to identify the different 
forms it can take in order to facilitate the targeting of appropriate policies and 
interventions at the different forms.   
 
The practical significance of any classification scheme therefore needs to be borne in 
mind when it is developed.   A broadly based classification scheme that takes account 
of the possibilities for intervention as a basis for Government policy may be built 
upon existing frameworks, but it will be most valuable if it integrates current 
information on both the arsonists involved and the targets of their activities. 
 
Existing classifications of arsonists have been developed for their own specific 
contexts, typically either for clinical purposes or crime investigations.  They are 
usually  derived from the opportunity samples available.   Many of these schemes also 
suffer from a focus on „motives‟ or „motivation‟. It is often assumed that many 
crimes, including arson, can be best understood by considering the differing motives 
of the perpetrators.  However, the concepts of „motive‟ and „motivation‟ have been 
shown over 100 years of psychological study to be extremely complex and often very 
ambiguous. They can mean, inter alia, objective, reason, explanation, or cause and 
they can imply aspects of the crime that the offender is aware of as well as aspects 
that the offender has no direct knowledge of. Motivation and human intentions are 
usually mixed and multiple and there are dangers in assigning any individual or act 
into a particular subset based on motivation as this may change over time, place and 
situation. This all leads some classification schemes to be rather confusing and 
unclear. In the following consideration of classifications of arsonists an attempt is 
therefore made to avoid reference to „motives‟ unless that can be clarified.  
 
There are many possible reasons why someone may start a fire (Lewis & Yarnell 
(1951), Prins (1994), Kidd (1996), Wood (2000).). Depending on the researcher, the 
number of   categories   ranges from 3 to 200 sub categories. Yet most of these 
classification schemes tend to be derived from inferences about human intention. 
Since the writings of Durkheim (1897) the weakness inherent in surmise about such 
an intimate and private a process has been highlighted. Such weaknesses are 
especially important if the categories are taken as a basis for policy. Prins (1994) 
emphasised these difficulties when he concluded that a number of different typologies 
of arson, confuse the motivations and the characteristics of the arsonists, often 
producing overlapping categories. It is therefore important to develop a framework 
that will reduce these ambiguities and provide a way of distinguishing between the 
acts of arson that takes account of both the characteristics of the arsonist and of the 
property that is set alight. 
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The Home Office Arson Scoping Study 1999 proposed four broad categories for the 
purposes of policy formulation and planning interventions; youth disorder, malicious, 
psychological and criminal.  These categories were drawn from the existing literature 
but formulated so as to relate in general to the different types of individuals involved 
in setting fires. This enables the relevant agencies that have responsibility for these 
different sorts of people to be identified. That fourfold classification therefore 
provides the most fruitful starting point for developing a strategy for dealing with 
arson.   
 
These four categories are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Classification scheme proposed by the Home Office Arson scoping study 
1999. 
 
Category of Arson Motivation 
Youth disorder and nuisance Vandalism and boredom 
Malicious Revenge 
Racism 
Clashes of beliefs/rivalries) 
Personal animosities 
Psychological Mental illness 
Suicide 
Criminal Financial gain 
Concealment of crime (theft, murder etc) 
 
 
 
Since the Scoping document there have been some further studies of arson but they do 
not provide any results that would indicate a fundamental change to the classification 
system proposed in the Scoping study.  The only small change for clarity would be to 
label the third category, „emotional expression‟ rather than „psychological‟, indicating 
the focus to the psychological problems the arsonists in this sub-group have.  
 
Seven studies provide enough detail to act as a basis for developing the Scoping study 
fourfold classification further.  They are presented in Table 2 with an indication of the 
category labels of the various authors in relation to the four Scoping categories.  This 
shows that there is little difficulty in accommodating the various perspectives into the 
overall framework.  These studies do cover a range of different sources of 
information.  Marsh (2000) for example used questionnaires attached to the formal 
pro forma that the Fire Service completes, whereas Kidd (1996) studied 645 cases of 
arson derived from newspaper reports.  Rix (1994) studied 153 arsonists referred for 
pre-trial psychiatric reports. Canter and Fritzon (1998) worked with the reports 
available from arson investigators. Any one source of information is undoubtedly 
biased in important ways, most significantly it will omit certain subsets of arson that 
do not happen to be captured by that particular data collection procedure. A mixture 
of sources is therefore essential. 
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Table 2 Current classifications of arson incorporated into the proposed framework. 
 
Articles Youth 
disorder & 
nuisance 
Malicious Emotional 
expression 
Criminal 
Canter & 
Fritzon 1998. 
Instrumental 
object 
Instrumental 
person 
Expressive 
person 
Expressive 
object 
 
Day 2001 Vandalism  Anger/revenge Attention 
seeking. 
Excitement. 
Concurrent 
with other 
offence. 
Fritzon 
1998/2001 
Damage Destroy Despair 
Display 
 
Kidd 1996  Revenge 
Terrorist/extre
mist 
Mental 
problems 
Heroism 
Excitement 
Conceal crime 
Financial gain 
 
Marsh 2000 Vandalism 
Fireplay 
Revenge 
Racial 
Excitement 
Mental illness 
Conceal crime 
Profit 
Rix 1994 Vandalism Revenge 
Manipulative 
Political 
Excitement 
Cry for help 
Suicide 
Psychotic 
Heroism 
Antidepressant 
Re-housing  
Financial 
Cover up 
Proxy 
Wood 2000 Vandalism Revenge Excitement 
Mental illness 
Despondency 
Conceal crime 
profit 
 
Drawing on these and related studies the four forms of arson will now be considered. 
 
Youth Disorder 
 
Within this category lie two different types of firesetters. One involves young children 
playing with fire as a from of curiosity without malicious intent. The second involves 
young children using fire as a form of vandalism. 
 
Children playing with fire 
Those children who occasionally or accidentally start fires while unsupervised may be 
described as non-severe firesetters. Fire play grows out of curiosity or exploratory 
behaviour not usually involving the child‟s own property. This excludes fire setting 
that deliberately expresses anger and revenge. 
  
In one of the few direct studies of fire play Kafry (1980) investigated fire behaviour 
and knowledge in a sample of young normal boys. A random sample of 99 boys from 
California were interviewed with their parents. In addition the parents were asked to 
complete a questionnaire. Kafry found that 45% of the boys studied played with fire. 
Single incidents of fire play resulted in fires for 33% of the cases while 81% of the 
repeater fire players caused fires. This high level of prevalence supports Lewis and 
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Yarnell‟s (1951) observation that the incidence of children who play with fire is far 
greater that any statistics show. The fascination that young children have with fire 
does appear to be very widespread and possibly universal. 
 
Fineman (1991) states that the curiosity firesetter is usually a young boy aged 
between 5 and 10, reporting that 60% of fires set be children can be attributed to 
curiosity. Regular access to matches and lighters is also associated with fire play, 89% 
of parents whose child played with fire smoked (Wood 1995). Therefore not only had 
the child access to lighters and matches but also the visual display of a flame when 
lighting cigarettes may confirm acceptability and encouragement in a young child‟s 
mind. Wood 1995 found that fire play children come from a stable intact family 
background, have a higher than average level of curiosity hence their interest in fire 
play. Those who persist in setting fires are predominately male, exhibit higher levels 
of behavioural and psychological dysfunction. They are often part of families which 
are in turmoil, experiencing disruption, conflict and disharmony. He suggests that an 
important cause of child fire setting action is routed in the social background in which 
the child is raised. 
 
Researchers in America are currently examining the link between juvenile firesetting 
and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). ADHD is a neurobiological 
disability characterised by attention skills that are developmentally inappropriate, 
impulsivity, and in some cases, hyperactivity. Low self esteem and other behavioural 
difficulties can accompany it. A non-profit, parent based organisation formed to better 
the lives of individuals with attention deficit disorders and those who care for them, 
CHADD, indicates that 3-5% of the school age population in the US have ADHD, 
they also estimate that as many as 50% of the children with this disability are 
undiagnosed.  
 
Portland (Oregon) Fire and Rescue has collected information on children participating 
in the Juvenile Firesetting Intervention Programme diagnosed (through professional 
testing) with ADHD over a five year period 1994-1999, (Porth 2000). The carried out 
579 interviews and confirmed that 19.9%, i.e. 115 participants were confirmed to 
have ADHD. This compares with ADHD rate in the general population of 3-5%.  
 
ADHD children have difficulty following instructions and carry out dangerous actions 
without thinking of the consequences. There is currently no evidence that ADHD 
actually causes firesetting behaviour directly. Anecdotal information on recidivism 
from youth firesetting intervention programs in America postulate that it is more 
likely due to the way in which these children are taught which doesn‟t always fit with 
how they. The suggestion is that these children do not learn that certain acts can be 
dangerous  (Porth 2000). 
  
Fire-play is dangerous and often results in severe fires. The scale of these is  affected 
both by the child‟s actions and also by chance factors such as availability of 
combustible materials and the weather. Young children also may panic leave the room 
and close the door failing to inform anybody about the fire. This may result in tragic 
consequences. Wood (1995) states that in one brigade alone 13 deaths have been 
attributed to children playing with fires in the years 1990-95. Although this sub 
category does not amount to the criminal offence of arson, as there is no intention to 
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commit a crime it does indicate a severe problem that needs to be addressed by 
parents and other agencies.  
 
 
 
 
Vandalism  
Fire vandalism is an antisocial disruptive behaviour. Swaffer (1993) defined this 
group as delinquent, typically anti-social, individuals for whom firesetting is not the 
only problem behaviour exhibited. The majority may already be known to various 
agencies for offending behaviours ranging from theft, breaking and entering, to 
truancy and malicious damage (Strachan 1981). This type of firesetting activity is 
often committed by groups of youngsters where the choice of target is opportunistic. 
Criminological explanations for these acts of vandalism have shifted from 
psychological reasons such as aggression and frustration to more sociological reasons 
such as lack of employment, lack of stimulating schooling, and inadequate provisions 
for youngsters to express their developmental needs in legitimate ways (Home Office 
1988). 
 
Firesetting of this type is more likely to occur in areas of social deprivation. As people 
leave the area in search of work they leave properties empty, which then become 
targets for arson. The general deprivation of an area may also lead to people dumping 
rubbish in the streets and open spaces, providing further opportunities for arson. 
These areas may be used for the dumping of stolen vehicles which, if they have not 
already been set alight by the individuals who stole them, become targets for others. 
In these areas fire is used with disregard for the law and property. In severe cases 
areas may accept this type of arson as custom and practice because it occurs so 
regularly that there is a danger that parents, the community, local authorities and the 
police may not take the appropriate action to kerb the problem. 
 
Wood (2000) found that 89% of detected fire-vandals were aged 6-15 years, the 
average age being 12.13 years. Wood also distinguished between solo and partnership 
offenders. Solo offenders, committing 28% of fire vandalism, had an average age of 
12.8 years. Partnered offenders committed 72% of the fires and had an average age of 
11.9 years. Individuals in this category are less likely than other types of arsonists to 
be psychologically disturbed. Ninety-two percent of the attacks took place between 
the hours of 13.30 and 23.30. Forty-three percent, however, were between 13.30 and 
17.30.  The significance of the local community and urban context for these sorts of 
fires is also emphasized in Fritzon‟s (2001) study.  She found that the majority of fires 
involving vandalism are committed in close proximity to the offenders‟ home, usually 
no more than 1 km distant.   
 
These arsonists are most likely to target vehicles, uninhabited property, residential 
buildings, schools, factories and shops. This group of arsonists are also thought to be 
responsible for the majority of deliberately ignited secondary fires. This includes 
rubbish and skips etc. This type of arson is usually unplanned arising from 
opportunity, bravado and social peer pressure. There is a danger however that a 
firesetting  vandal may progress towards serial arson, setting increasingly severe fires,   
indicating some fascination with fire itself. Such individuals would be considered 
 9 
within the Emotional Expression sub-group, but there is currently no empirical 
evidence to indicate prevalence of such a development in offence behaviour  
 
In areas of social deprivation firesetting  may used as a  deviant display in an attempt 
to push against the limits of tolerance within a community. As the number of arson 
attacks increase in one area there is the possibility that this sort of behaviour will 
become tolerated, accepted and normalised. This type of antisocial behaviour if 
allowed to continue will spread and affect other disadvantaged areas in close 
proximity. Individuals who commit this offence are often  not aware of the 
consequences of fire itself. This is coupled with the knowledge that they are unlikely 
to be apprehended.  These personal and social factors combine to make vandalism a 
major source of arson in this country. 
 
 
 Malicious 
 
It is often assumed that arson is a crime against property.  However it does share some 
of the characteristics of personal or violent crimes in often being an attack against a 
person or group of people. Put simply, fire is sometimes chosen as a weapon.  
 
Most studies of arson have cited revenge as one of the major exaplanations (Prins 
1996).  This includes intimidation or retaliation against a person, a group, an 
institution, or society as a whole. Canter & Fritzon 1998 suggested that this form of 
arson often occurred as a direct result of a dispute between the offender and another 
person, usually an ex-partner, or sometimes ex-employer. This dispute causes anger 
and a sense of injustice within the individual, which s/he may attempt to redress by 
arson. The victim of a malicious fire often has a history of interpersonal or 
professional conflict with the offender.  
 
The arsonist may be a neighbour with a grudge who commits an arson attack on a 
neighbours‟ house. The attack is often unsubtle, involving burning paper or a standard 
accelerant being forced through the letterbox. The seriousness of these attacks is 
emphasised by the fire often being set in the main, or only, escape route from the 
building and many of these incidents occurring at night. 
 
Wood (2000) reports that the average age of revenge arsonists is 25.6 years. Thirty-
three percent were under 18 and 15% under 11.  Nurcombe (1964) discusses a 6-year-
old‟s expression of resentment against the attention paid to his brother by setting the 
baby‟s cot on fire. Females account for 15% of apprehended arsonists for this 
category (Wood 1999). This supports the view that arson committed by females often 
has a strong emotional component and is used predominantly as a tool for expressing 
aggression. Previous research often cites revenge as the most common single reason 
for arson by females (Bourget & Bradford 1989, Stewart 1993). However Bourget and 
Bradford (1989) had a  limited sample from a psychiatric population of 15 females 
charged with arson referred to the department of forensic psychiatry at the Royal 
Ottowa Hospital for pre-trial examinations. Stewart‟s (1993) sample was also likely to 
be biased towards a psychiatric population because it consisted of 25 female arsonists 
and 25 female controls admitted to Holloway Prison.  
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Rix (1994) also showed that this type of arson is common within samples of 
psychiatric arsonists. Revenge accounted for almost a third of the arsonists he studied. 
In most cases the property belonged to the person towards whom the arsonists felt 
angry. Three individuals, in Rix‟s sample however, wanted to take revenge against 
society as a whole. 
 
A single offender working alone usually commits this type of arson. Whilst some 
incidents were spontaneous, usually associated with  alcohol and drug intoxication, 
most revealed elements of planning. In 75% of cases the offender brought materials to 
the scene to enhance the spread of fire (Wood 1999). Revenge arsonists were found to 
use flammable liquid accelerants in more cases than any other type of arson. 
 
People committing arson for revenge  travel a variety of distances, with a minimum of 
0.02km and a maximum 116.26km and an average distance travelled of 6.24km 
(Fritzon 2001).  The location of the target is the main factor. Offenders will travel the 
required distance in order to burn the intended property.  
 
The targeted property often varies with the sex of the offender. Female arsonists 
usually target something of significance to the victim, such as a vehicle or personal 
effects. A male arsonist may also set fire to something of personal significance, but 
his fire setting can become more wide-ranging and disruptive.  
 
For revenge arsonists in general the main targets are residential property and vehicles. 
Malicious arsonists who seek revenge from society may choose targets with no 
obvious plan; others will retaliate against specific institutions such as churches, 
schools, public buildings or particular businesses. 
 
Another type of arsonist contained within this category is the terrorist or social protest 
firesetter. These arsonists almost always work in groups and generally take credit for 
their actions. These fires are pre-planned therefore the methods and materials used are 
more sophisticated than those used in other types of arson. Such arsonists target 
symbolic buildings such as government facilities or animal testing laboratories.   
Arson attacks may also occur during times of civil unrest, such as those in Northern 
Ireland and more recently Oldham and Burnley. Groups of people roam the streets 
setting buildings and vehicles alight. Vehicles especially are vulnerable as they 
provide ready opportunities and can be used to form burning barricades.  
 
 
Emotional Expression 
 
Jackson, Glass and Hope (1987) identified certain individuals who lack the ability 
directly to communicate their frustration, pain or feelings of hostility. These 
individuals may use arson as a form of emotional expression, a means of 
communication, to express a desire, wish, or need for change. This includes cry for 
help or attention-seeking arson, would-be hero arson and attempted suicide.  
 
Firesetting in this context is extremely coercive, as the weapon is so powerful. 
Individuals who are unable to use constructive means to have the impact they desire, 
or to use direct forms of physical or verbal coercion, may use firesetting as a way of 
achieving their goals. Such people are likely to be very angry although they may not 
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have any way of expressing that verbally.  They externalise it by directing it at 
themselves in a suicide attempt or at inanimate objects. As Geller (1992) argues, 
arson is a good medium of expression for certain individuals because it is overtly 
confrontational and requires no verbal exchange or direct communication of any kind. 
 
 
Pyromania 
 
The term pyromania dates back to the nineteenth century when it was a popular topic 
in the scientific literature. The term is currently defined in the most recent edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association 1994) as: - 
Repeated deliberate and purposeful firesetting associated with tension or 
affective arousal before the act, followed by intense pleasure or relief when 
setting the fires or witnessing/participating in the aftermath. 
 
Pyromania is the diagnosis least frequently used for firesetters. They are more likely 
to be diagnosed by mental health practitioners as suffering either from an antisocial 
personality disorder, schizophrenia, mental retardation or organic psychosis (Barnett 
& Spitzer 1994). The definition is so extremely rare that clinicians in this country 
have come to doubt the usefulness of the classification.  
 
Some researchers use the term excitement motivated arsonists. The fires are set 
because the arsonist craves the excitement that it generates. Douglas et al (1997) 
reviewed arson research literature and actual arson cases, they also carried out 
interviews with incarcerated arsonists across the USA. They proposed that  these 
arsonists were seeking thrill or attention or  wanted recognition, or may in a minority 
of cases, gain sexual satisfaction from fire setting. Residential properties and public 
buildings are common targets. The individual may select a target that offers a good 
vantage point from which to safely observe the fire and the fire brigade. Serial 
offending is common with this type of offender and they are likely to have pre- 
convictions for arson and a history of police contact for nuisance offences. 
 
Some individuals derive excitement and satisfaction from not just the involvement in 
fire raising but also attending and/or busying themselves at the scene and calling out 
the fire brigade. This has been found to be a significant problem in the United States 
where firemen are often volunteers. Huff (1994) collected data concerning 16 solo 
offenders and 9 cases involving multiple offenders, in all 75 offenders responsible for 
182 fires. Huff indicated that in 89% of cases the predominant explanation was the 
excitement the fire setter obtained from the fire. The incidence of this type of arson is 
so far unstudied in the UK.  
 
Individuals may also set fires as a means of relieving frustrations or to enhance 
themselves in the eyes of their employers. In these cases there is sometimes evidence 
of a number of small fires being set prior to a serious fire. These fires may coincide 
with the appointment of the individual. The offender pretends to discover and deal 
with the fire situation, thereby showing willingness, efficiency and loyalty. Arsonists 
who commit this type of arson may often be male security guards, inexperienced 
police officers and retained fire fighters between  25 and 35 years old (Wood 1999). A 
well-known example is the case of Fleur Lombard the first female fire fighter to die 
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on peacetime duty. Ms Lombard died in a Bristol supermarket fire in 1996. A security 
guard was later jailed for manslaughter and arson.  
 
Research carried out at Rampton, a high security hospital, collected detailed 
information concerning 60 participants who had either an index offence of arson; or 
there was documented and corroborative evidence of firesetting. The main objective 
of the study was to identify empirical measures which help to establish core clinical 
needs of the individual arsonist; and to evaluate his/her respective risk of re-offending 
(Haggett 2001). The study reports on a group of individuals they called „chaotic 
arsonists‟, who use fire as a means of coping with negative feelings such as sadness, 
loneliness, anger and rage associated with their abusive family backgrounds, (Haggett 
2001). Individuals in this group habitually use arson as a method of handling 
difficulties and problems. They have often been in care before the age of sixteen and 
have extensive social services involvement. With no specific trigger, fires are used as 
a way of communicating a general discontent with society.  
 
For some individuals arson becomes another form of self-harm. Many have engaged 
in numerous episodes of self-injury and attention seeking behaviours such as wasting 
police time or making hoax calls, (Stewart 1993). Although these individuals do not 
generally set fires as a deliberate attempt to kill, their impulsiveness often leads to 
endangerment of lives. 
 
 
Criminal   
 
This category involves two forms of arson; that used to cover up evidence of another 
crime and that for financial gain. 
 
Cover up another crime 
 
These offenders are not interested in the fire itself. It is only used to destroy potential 
incriminating evidence. The target is therefore dependent on the nature of the 
concealment; it may be a business, a residence or a vehicle. In murder concealment, 
arson is used to destroy forensic evidence, and/or conceal the victim‟s identity.  
 
In Wood‟s (1999) study slightly less than two-thirds of criminal offenders were aged 
between 17-22 years. Therefore identifying older adolescents as the main perpetrators 
of crime concealment arson. His analysis found that 94% of cases involved theft and 
100% involved forcible entry. Cars were found to be the primary target followed by 
residential property. 
 
In the majority of arson to conceal another crime cars are involved either through „joy 
riding‟ or cars used for other crimes. Often  multiple offenders are involved. The 
individuals are likely to be young adult males who live within the surrounding area 
and are likely to have a history of contact with the police. Alcohol and recreational 
drug use is also common with this type of offender (Douglas et al 1997). 
 
Financial gain 
 
Wood (1999) identified four types of individuals who commit arson for financial gain 
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 Semi-professional or professional paid offenders  Paid individuals with little or no fire experience  Economically restricted business or property owners.  Individuals covering inventory losses. 
 
Fires of this sort are often more sophisticated in planning and execution than other 
types of arson, presumably because a so-called „hired torch‟ may instigate this type of 
fire. As the complete destruction of the target is intended there may be evidence of 
excessive use of accelerant and multiple seats of fire. Items of value are often 
removed, especially if a residence is the target. While it may be clear that the owner 
of a property stands to gain from the consequences of a fire it can be very hard to 
prove direct involvement due to the possible involvement of a third party. While the 
insured or owner may be closely examined as to his whereabouts at the time of the 
fire if using a „hired torch‟ the individual will usually have a strong alibi. Hired 
torches are likely to be mature adults working alone with pre-convictions for burglary 
and possibly even arson. 
 
Research conducted in Britain identified 71 cases of actual or suspected arson in 
businesses over the period 1990-1995, with an overall value of £38.5m (Clarke 1996).  
Clarke carried out interviews with loss adjusters and ascertained that Fraudulent arson 
in Britain does not show a pattern of significant involvement by organised crime. 
Regionally there was an increase of cases in the London area. All the businesses were 
small or medium sized, whether this was due to large companies expertly undertaking 
arson frauds therefore remaining undetected was not clear. There were a number of 
identifiable financial motives however the financial records of the business may not 
necessarily reveal a financial motive it may be a case of simple financial gain rather 
than financial distress.  
 
Two individuals in Wood‟s (1999) sample set fire in order to be re-housed and one 
individual was a fraudulent insurance claim. All three cases involved the offenders 
setting fire to their own residence. These cases did not however involve hired torches. 
The use of fire in order to be re-housed is a new phenomenon in arson research. Rix 
(1994) did report such incidences. All of the subjects set fires in the hope that the 
council would rehouse them. 
 
An innovative study carried out in Knowsley, Liverpool shows the relationship 
between the number of cars burnt out in the area and the price of scrap metal. The 
research carried out by Michael Townsley for the Department of Civic Design within 
the University of Liverpool showed quite clearly that as the price of scrap metal 
severely decreased the number of cars found burnt out dramatically increased. This 
suggests that owners of cars unlikely to gain any money from scrapping their old car 
have their vehicle burnt and may then claim on the insurance. This is likely to be the 
case around the UK and be responsible for a large proportion of the rising number of 
vehicles being set alight.  
 
The Home Office has recently commissioned a pilot project in Knowsley an area in 
Merseyside. The project aims to help police by using evidence based policing and 
problem-solving techniques. One of the crimes examined is the problem of burnt out 
vehicles in the area. Merseyside police estimate that an average burnt out car costs 
local authorities and other relevant agencies £1250.  
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 In the Knowsley area there are three reasons why cars are burnt out. 
1) By joyriders 
2) In order to claim fraudulently on the insurance. 
3) By vandals targeting abandoned vehicles  
 
Knowsley Burnouts 95-00
0
15
30
45
60
Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00
£2/tn £40/tn Price of scrap metal
Figure  Graph presented by Pease & Townsley at Environmental criminology and 
crime analysis seminar June 2001 held in Liverpool. 
 
The authors argue that before 1998 the majority of burnt out vehicles were the result 
of joyriders setting fire to stolen vehicles. They also argue that the increase in the 
number of burnt out vehicles is due to increases in the number of individuals 
abandoning their vehicles and also increase in number of individuals setting fire to 
their own vehicle in order to claim insurance. 
 
Pease and Townsley give three explanations for this dramatic increase. 
 
1) As the graph shows the cost of scrap metal has decreased from £40 per ton to just 
£2 per ton. Therefore an individual wishing to scrap their vehicle would receive 
significantly less money after 1998 than before. 
 
2) Environmental legislation, The Waste Disposal Act states that scrap metal dealers 
must carry out a number of procedures, when scraping vehicles, such as removal 
of tyres and engine fluids. These procedures cost the scrap dealer money which he 
passes on to the customer. 
 
3) Due to the large number of vehicles being stolen the police do not have the funds 
or time to scrutinise claims that an individuals vehicle has been stolen. 
 
These 3 explanations combine to lead individuals either to abandon their vehicle or to 
ignite them themselves and claim on the insurance.  
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Very little is known about the scale of fraudulent arson, as no one knows the number 
of fires wrongly attributed to accidents, or to arson but the owner not suspected. 
Attempts to quantify the impact of fraud involving arson is fraught with difficulty 
particularly when it is being carried out by experienced and organised criminals, 
offenders who will be very hard to detect. Another difficulty is the usually 
circumstantial nature of the evidence. However if fires are being organised in a 
repetitive basis by criminal entrepreneurs then it may be possible to identify patterns 
and in due course target individuals.   
 
Summary of Arson Classification 
 
Four broad forms of arson have been identified.  In general these can be ordered from 
five and six year olds playing with matches and setting light to materials 
opportunistically available, through adolescent vandalism of empty property and 
abandoned cars, and on to people who are typically a little older who use fire setting 
as a way of seeking revenge.  A different group are people who set fires for   
emotionally disturbed reasons or to gain some personal benefit from the excitement. 
They will tend to be older than the adolescent or malicious groups and will target 
property that has some particular significance to themselves.  A further and very large 
group set fires for criminal reason, either to hide a crime or for direct financial gain. 
 
It must be emphasised that many acts of arson will draw from a mix of these different 
categories, but just as most colours are a mix of their primary elements, it is useful to 
identify the primary forms of arson in order to guide policy making.  Broadly the sorts 
of people who commit the different forms of arson can be distinguished from each 
other and their targets will be different so that the agencies that can contribute to the 
reducing each form of arson can be distinguished. These agencies require some idea 
of the scale of the different forms of arson. That will now be considered. 
 
 
THE MAGNITUDE AND DISTRIBUTION OF FORMS OF ARSON IN THE 
UK 
 
The Magnitude of Arson in the UK 
 
Arson is currently the largest single cause of fire in UK currently standing at 46% of 
all fires. It is estimated that deliberate fires have doubled over the last decade 
resulting in an average week of 3,500 deliberately started fires, 50 injuries and 2 
deaths (Home Office 1999). Establishing the exact figures for arson is problematic for 
many reasons. One is that both the fire service and the police record the number of 
deliberately started fires in different ways, resulting in rather different figures. 
National Fire Statistics are compiled from the fire report forms (FDR) completed by 
each fire brigade. The Home Office then take a sample of 1 out of every 5 forms 
returned, unless the fire resulted in a casualty in which case it is definitely entered, 
and use this sample to calculate their figures.  
 
The FDR forms require fire officers to indicate if they think the cause of the fire was 
malicious. On the basis of these reports it estimated that there has been a continued 
long-term increase in the number of deliberate fires attended by the fire service. The 
number of malicious fires recorded by the fire service in 1999 was 102,900 this is a 
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rise of 19% over previous figures. The main reason for this increase was a 30% rise in 
road vehicle fires up 30% to 63,200. Malicious fires in road vehicles have more than 
trebled over the last ten years. Of the 31,800 malicious fires in buildings more than 
half (56%) occurred in building other than dwellings. There is no national measure of 
the number of malicious secondary fires (outdoor fires involving grassland and refuse 
and derelict buildings) however of the 207,800 secondary fires reported in 1997, 
around a half are thought to be of malicious ignition. Analysis by fire brigade area 
shows that malicious fires are highly concentrated, with almost half occurring within 
the seven metropolitan areas. 
 
The police record malicious fires as arson as defined by the Criminal Damage Act 
1971 (sections 1-3). In 1999 the number or arson offences recorded by the police was 
53,800 and the number cleared up was 4,800 (Home Office 1999).  The number of 
prosecutions and cautions has fallen over the past ten years despite the significant 
increase in the number of deliberate fires. 
 
As indicated above, there do seem to be some important differences in the forms of 
arson for which property if the target and the form for which vehicles are the target.  It 
is therefore helpful to consider the different frequencies of arson against these 
different targets.  The national statistics produced by the Home Office give some 
indication of the numbers and types of arsonists involved in relation to different forms 
of target using figures taken from the FDR-1 forms for the year 1999. These are 
shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Number of deliberate fires for property and other buildings by age of 
offender taken from the FDR-1 forms for 1999. 
 
 Total number 
deliberate 
fires 
Adult 
0ver 18 
Youth 
10-18 
Child 
under 10 
Unspecified 
Total 
property 
31,771 13,121 9,805 3,376 5,469 
Dwellings 13,842 6,315 3,628 1,825 2,075 
Other 
building 
17,927 6,807 6,178 1,552 3,392 
Vehicle 63,175 32,446 15,919 336 14,474 
 
It is clear that vehicle arson is virtually double that for all property combined. What is 
also worth noting is the significant number of unspecified in this category reflecting 
the difficulty fire officers have in attributing vehicle fires to an age category. 
Furthermore, there is also a rather different pattern across the age groups that accords 
with the earlier consideration of the different forms of arson.  In considering the 
proportions of different forms of arson it will therefore be appropriate to examine 
property and vehicle arson separately.  
 
Deliberate vehicle fires has risen 30% in 1999 from 48,800 in 1998 to 63,175. The 
number of deliberately set fires in vehicles has more than trebled in the last ten years 
(National Fire Statistics 1999). This increase can partially be explained by vehicle 
fires often being recorded by the police as stolen despite the fact that it was also burnt 
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out. However this problem in now being addressed and the police are changing their 
recording system. 
 
 
 Proportions of the Different Forms of Arson 
 
No national figures exist that allow an estimate of the number of each different form 
of arson. However, a number of different studies do provide details of the numbers of 
each form of arson in the samples they studied. Some estimate can therefore be made 
from these studies of the proportion of each form of arson in each sample. By making 
some allowances for the obvious biases in the samples it is therefore possible to 
provide an overall estimate of the proportion of arsons nationally that can be assigned 
to each of the four major forms that have been discussed above. Table 4 summarises 
the proportions from those studies that allow a reasonable estimate to be drawn.  
 
 Table 4. Proportions of Arsonists in each of the four main subgroups indicated in 
seven different samples. 
 
Study Youth disorder 
& nuisance 
Malicious Emotional 
expression 
Criminal 
Day 2001 Vandalism  
10% 
Anger/revenge 
50% 
Attention 
seeking. 15% 
Excitement10% 
Concurrent with 
other offence 15% 
Fritzon 1998 Damage 26.5% Destroy 20% Despair 18.5% 
Display 10% 
 
Fritzon 2001 Damage 27% Destroy 26% Despair 38% 
Display 6% 
 
Kidd 1998  Revenge 24% 
Terrorist  2% 
Mental problems 
20% 
Heroism 1% 
Excitement 5% 
Conceal crime 7% 
Financial gain 6% 
 
Marsh 2000 Vandalism 73% 
Fireplay 8% 
Revenge 3% 
Racial 2% 
Excitement 7% 
Mental illness3% 
Conceal crime 2% 
Profit 2% 
Rix 1994 Vandalism 9% Revenge 31% 
Manipulative 
4% 
Political 1% 
Excitement 11% 
Cry for help 7% 
Suicide 7% 
Psychotic 5% 
Heroism 4% 
Antidepressant 
2% 
Re-housing 7% 
Financial 5% 
Cover up 5% 
Proxy 2% 
Wood 2000 Vandalism 56% Revenge 23% Excitement 7% 
Mental illness8%  
Despondency 5% 
Conceal crime 
13% 
Profit 2% 
 
 
Property 
 
Youth Disorder and Nuisance 
The proportion of deliberate property fires attributed to this category is 35%. The 
values for this category range from 9% right up to 81%. However the mean value is 
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around 35%. It is interesting to note that samples taken from prison and psychiatric 
populations report very low frequencies i.e. 9 and 10%. These two samples contain 
adult arsonists that other studies have shown are less likely  to commit arson for 
vandalism. The very high frequency of 81% was from a study carried out in 
Newcastle‟s West End (Marsh 2000), a location that was suffering at the time from 
very high levels of this type of arson. Youths and children in the area were 
responsible for 71.5% of deliberate property fires.   
 
This figure of 35% is also supported by the national statistics that show that youth and 
children set approximately 13,181 deliberate fires which equates to 41% of deliberate 
property fires. This is above the stated proportion of 35%. However some children, 
and juveniles especially, may belong in another category; the stated proportion 
therefore should be under 41%.  
 
Malicious 
The proportion of deliberate property fires attributed to this category is 26%. The 
values for this category range from 5% to 50%. However the mean value is 
approximately 26%. It is interesting to note that samples taken from prison and 
psychiatric populations are very high i.e. 36% and 50%. Reflecting the research which 
indicates that adults commonly commit arson for malicious reasons, and studies that 
demonstrate that a significant number of arsonists who are mentally ill commit arson 
for malicious reasons.  
 
The research carried out in Newcastle‟s West End however only attributed 5% of fires 
to malicious reasons. In Marsh‟s (2000) study, information was collected using an 
FDR-1 additional questionnaire, the attending fire officer therefore inferred reason the 
why a fire was deliberately set. The category malicious may be more difficult to infer 
than other categories such as youth disorder. Which may explain the low frequency in 
relation to other studies, which obtained information from the arsonists themselves.  
 
Emotional Expression 
The proportion of deliberate property fires attributed to this category is 24%. The 
values for this category range from 10% to 44%. However the mean value is 
approximately 24%. It is not surprising that the samples taken from a psychiatric 
population contained one of the highest frequencies. Interestingly the sample taken 
from a prison population shows a high proportion in this category. 
 
This figure is higher than indicated by the Arson Prevention Bureau, which states that 
17% of those being prosecuted for arson offences are mentally ill. This figure of 17% 
however is based on those arsonists that have been prosecuted and this is of course a 
small proportion of the arsonists that do not get caught. The studies show that more 
people are using fire as a means of expressing their emotions than is currently 
thought. However this is for deliberate property fires only. 
 
Criminal 
The proportion of deliberate property fires attributed to this category is 15%. The 
values range from 4% to 17%. However the median value is 15%. The study carried 
out in Newcastle is the only outlier of the frequencies with only 4% being attributed 
to this criminal category. This may be due to the method of data collection mentioned 
previously, or the fact that arsons in the area being committed by adult arsonists were 
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not as common as those committed by youths. Research shows that it is mainly adults 
who commit deliberate property fires for criminal reasons. 
 
 
Vehicle 
 
Unfortunately very few studies have attempted to quantify the proportion of deliberate 
vehicle fires attributable to different categories of offenders. One that does is Marsh 
(2000).  
 
Youth Disorder and Nuisance 
The proportion of deliberate vehicle fires attributed to this category is 39%. National 
fire statistics show that 26% of vehicle fires can be attributed to youths or children. 
This is less than the figure proposed of 39%, however many of the unspecified 
individuals will be youths and children. Of those fires attributed to one of the age 
categories, youth and children commit 50% of the fires. This figure is higher than the 
39% proposed but many youths will belong to another category such as criminal. The 
figure of 39% is also approximately the mean value between the two values of 26 and 
50 and also the proportion attributed by Marsh (2000). The proportion of property and 
vehicle fires attributed to this category are both very high therefore reflecting the 
large number of arsonists in  this category who target both property and vehicles.  
 
Malicious 
The proportion of deliberate vehicle fires attributed to this category is 3%. This 
category of arsonist therefore specifically targets property as opposed to vehicles. 
 
Emotional Expression 
The proportion of deliberate vehicle fires attributed to this category is 13%. This 
figure is supported when the proportion of property and vehicle fires attributed to this 
category are joined together. The proportion of all fires attributed to this category is 
18.5%, which is very similar to the figure of 17% given by the Arson Prevention 
Bureau. 
 
Criminal 
The proportion of deliberate vehicle fires attributed to this category is 45%. While the 
proportion of deliberate fires for property is the lowest of all the categories, 
individuals are obviously targeting vehicles more frequently either to cover up other 
criminal activity or to make fraudulent insurance claims.  
 
Summary of Proportions of Various Forms of Arson 
 
The estimates given above are summarised in Table 5, where the total figures for 
property and vehicle arson in 1999 are given.  This table draws attention to two clear 
processes. One is the significance of youth disorder for both property and vehicle 
crime. Policies that address youth disorder directly are likely therefore to have a major 
impact on arson as a whole. Given the likelihood that many of these acts of arson are 
committed by individuals local to the fire,  in a social context that may go some way 
to facilitate the action,  leads to the perspective that community related strategies may 
be particularly effective. 
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The second process to emerge strongly from Table 5 is the amount of criminal activity 
that now occurs around setting fire to vehicles.  Given the very high proportion of 
arson that is vehicle related this suggests that successful strategies to tackle criminal 
arson of vehicles could have a very significant impact.  This must overlap with 
vandalism of vehicles and thus indicates that a combined strategy of reducing the 
activities of the arsonist and the possibilities of the targets being set alight will have 
considerable benefits. 
 
Malicious fires and those that are a product of emotional expression do seem to be a 
dominant focus on property. They are likely to be more diffuse in a community than 
vandalism and criminal arson.  They will therefore require rather different strategies 
to tackle them.  
 
Table 5  Estimated Proportions of Each Type of Arson 
 
 Property Vehicle 
Youth Disorder 35% 39% 
Malicious 26%   3% 
Emotional Expression 24% 13% 
Criminal 15% 45% 
Total number in 1999 31,771 63,175 
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STRATEGIES FOR ARSON 
 
Problems of Dealing with Arson 
The Home Office report on the Arson Scoping Study 1999 recognised that arson was 
not being dealt with nationally because of a number of different factors.  Confusion over data and measurement involving different agencies.  Confusion over arson related terminology  A reluctance to share information  Uncoordinated approach that masks the scale of arson as a problem  No clear lead agency for arson.  Agencies working in isolation oblivious to the work being carried out by other 
agencies.  Inconsistent approach to fire investigation: and  The police and insurance industry appearing less interested. 
  
Agencies Involved 
There are many agencies and organisations who come into contact with the arson 
problem or upon whom it has an impact. 
The responsibility for investigating arson falls to a number of different agencies.  
The fire brigade developed as reactive fire-fighting teams. Their primary concern is 
controlling and extinguishing fires. They also have responsibility for fire prevention 
and give detailed advice on fire safety. However only five brigades out of fifty in 
England and Wales have full time fire investigation teams (though others have part-
time ones). We must bear in mind however that there is no legal requirement upon the 
fire service to establish the cause of a fire. Fire brigades are encouraged to complete a 
Fire Data Report 1 (FDR-1) form for each property fire attended. Completion is not a 
statutory obligation or a mandatory undertaking in law. There is not therefore a 
statutory requirement or obligation for fire brigades to train personnel in investigation 
techniques. The level of experience and expertise therefore varies widely within the 
fire service. 
The police have a legal responsibility to investigate arson. However the majority of 
fires recorded by the fire brigades as “deliberate” are not recorded by the police as 
arson. Arson as a crime is relatively easy to commit yet difficult to investigate and 
prove. To undertake a criminal investigation requires a higher level of proof that arson 
has been committed than is required for a brigade to attribute a fire was deliberately 
started. Clear up rates for arson average at only 9% leading to less than 1% of 
deliberate fires recorded by the fire brigade resulting in a conviction. Arson is also not 
one of the key performance indicators for the police. Investigation tends to be seen as 
a low priority and if there is no immediate suspect, investigations will be vulnerable 
to being shelved as other cases take priority. The police have competing demands 
placed upon their time and resources with most officers receiving only limited 
training in fire investigation. 
 The Home Office Forensic Science Service has moved  towards agency status and 
now charges police and fire brigades for their services. In recent years there has been 
a decline in the number of arson cases submitted to the laboratory for examination. It 
is unclear how much of this decline is due to rising cost of the service. 
 The insurers and loss adjusters have an important role to play and although the 
insurance sector has been proactive in recent years supporting or sponsoring a range 
of arson control initiatives, for example. Resources they are donating are only a 
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fraction of the cost of arson to the insurance industry. The police and fire service 
suggest that insurers need to adopt a more active role in preventing arson and need to 
demonstrate that they are not content to bear the current level of arson and fraudulent 
claims. (Home Office 1999)    
There are a significant number of agencies that hold information in relation to 
arsonists.  
Insurance Industry: information held relating to claims, customer profile, property, 
premises and costs that may be associated with arson. 
Police: details held of criminals and criminal investigations. 
Criminal Justice System: information held relating to prosecution and punishment of 
arsonists. 
Probation Service: information held relating to prosecution, punishment, release and 
whereabouts of arsonists. 
Fire Service: information held about fire trends, activities and patterns of arson as 
well as the types of property affected. 
At present, sharing of information between agencies is rare and in many cases data 
protection concerns are used as an excuse (Home office 1999). 
 
 
SOURCE AND TARGET AS BASES FOR INTERVENTION 
 
A Framework for Inter-Agency Collaboration 
The mix of agencies for which arson is relevant requires that a coherent set of 
strategies for reducing arson be developed. It is essential to obtain some 
understanding of why people start fires deliberately if the policies then put into place 
are to have any significant impact on the problem. 
There is currently no structured co-ordinated approach based on comprehensive 
understanding of the deliberate fire problem or the offenders who carry out the 
deliberate fire attacks. 
 From our considerations of the current understanding of arson and the various forms 
of policy strategy available it is proposed that a coherent policy-oriented framework 
for reducing arson will best result out of an understanding of two primary 
constituents: 
a) The different psychological processes within arsonists that give rise to the 
acts of arson. This will be based on the categories of arson proposed by the 
Home Office Scoping Study 1999,which are solely for the purposes of 
policy intervention. Youth Disorder and nuisance, Malicious, 
Psychological and Criminal. Different agencies have responsibility for 
dealing with arsonists from each of these four categories. 
The different targets of arson will also be examined in order to elaborate the ways in 
which different psychological processes tend to lead to setting fires to different 
targets. This is especially important because the agencies that can reduce the 
vulnerability of targets are often different from those that deal with the fire setters 
themselves. Therefore a focus on targets of arson will carry different policy 
implications from a focus on perpetrators. 
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Only the Government can provide the framework for a truly effective arson reduction 
programme. If arson is to be controlled it is essential for there to be a co-ordinated 
strategy which involves short and long term planning backed by Government 
commitment and resources.  
 
Proactive initiatives and actions by a partnership of agencies offer the way ahead. 
New funding is needed for preventive work. In this age of preventative thinking it is 
incredible that fire services are still funded according to the number of fires they put 
out (Muckley 1999).   
 
In April 2000, the Arson Control Forum was created and given responsibility for 
providing the strategic direction to the arson prevention/investigation programme. The 
forum headed by HM Chief Inspector of Fire Services, Graham Meldrum has several 
detailed terms of reference, in broad terms these are likely to be: -  To work towards a reduction of deliberate fires and related deaths, injuries and 
damage.  To maintain a strategic overview of all general arson prevention matters.  To develop, monitor and support initiatives aimed at improving standards of arson 
prevention and public awareness of arson prevention issues.  To promote partnerships and co-ordination of effort in order to allow all 
stakeholders to contribute to the development of arson prevention policy.  To monitor, and contribute to, arson prevention work conducted in European and 
International bodies. 
Due to the nature of arson, the work of the forum will liase with other Home Office-
led crime reduction initiatives such as the Property Crime Reduction Action Team 
(PCRAT) and the Vehicle Crime Reduction Action Team (VCRAT). 
Given the complex nature of arson with its multiplicity of motives and preventative 
measures the Forum has four topic based sub groups: - 
1. Intervention this group addresses issues relating to the prevention and 
investigation of arson. 
2. Legislation this group assesses what legislative changes are required to address 
the arson issue. It contains three working groups. Criminal aspects, Civil aspects 
and Procedural aspects. 
3. Research and Data Collection this group will research issues surrounding arson 
including the collection and dissemination of data and will assist to identify the 
most effective tactics to reduce the incidence of arson. 
4. New Projects this group will consider local arson prevention initiatives, providing 
a degree of financial support where necessary and will roll out best practice. 
The Forum is in its infancy yet has already been allocated £3.8 million to be invest, 
however this figure is minute when compared to the financial cost of arson which is 
estimated at least £25 million per week.  
The work of the Arson Control Forum will be supported by the first ever Joint 
Thematic Review of police and fire services which is to be conducted by HM 
Inspectorate of Constabulary and HM Inspectorate of Fire Services. The review team 
will visit 6 brigades, Leicestershire, Lancashire, Bedfordshire, Mid and West Wales, 
Tyne and Wear and London, to examine the following areas: -  The training of officers engaged in arson investigation.  The joint arrangements for investigating arson. 
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 Current practices associated with the statistical recording of arson.  Arrangements for co-operation with other agencies  Juvenile Firesetter Intervention schemes and  Arson Prevention Initiatives. 
The findings of the Thematic review should be available late 2001 early 2002. 
 
The National Community Fire Safety Centre aims to provide a centre of excellence 
for community fire safety, developing high quality materials, recording best practice, 
undertaking mass media campaigns and co-ordinating the local plans implemented by 
individual brigades to ensure that they complement national objectives. It is essential, 
however, that they recognise the need to encourage local flexibility as nothing will 
demotivate brigade personnel, particularly those based at fire stations, more rapidly 
than seeing a pressing local problem ignored because it does not accord with the 
preconceptions of the national objectives. 
 
The Arson Prevention Bureau was established in 1991 by the Home Office and 
the  Association of British Insurers. Its aims are to spearhead and co-ordinate 
a national effort to reduce, prevent and detect arson. The APB is now solely 
administered by the ABI. The objectives of the APB are to: - 
  Monitoring the incidence of arson in the UK  Seek to improve the statistical base  Draw together information on arson from all UK sources, in particular on arson 
initiatives taken by Government departments, local authorities, fire brigades and 
the police.  Disseminate information on the incidence of arson and on appropriate remedial 
measures.  Organise and advise on publicity and education to combat arson.  Suggest areas requiring research, initiating such research or commissioning 
research projects  Monitor the arson situation in other countries. 
The scoping study recognised the importance of the Arson prevention bureau 
and anticipated that it will have a continuing role in support of the Arson 
Control Forum in its operational areas. The report of the arson working party 
part of the property crime reduction action team (2000) recommended that the 
APB should have a continuing role outside of the Home Office but in support 
of the Arson Control Forum. They see the APB as being important as a vehicle 
to share and co-ordinate action for note out of local level. The report also 
recognised that in order to avoid confusion, the role and functions of the ACF 
and the APB need careful presentation as currently there is some degree of 
overlap. The resources and staffing of the Bureau are, however, very limited.  
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 recognises that many of the problems 
affecting society, one of which being arson, cannot be addressed by one single 
agency on its own. The Act places a requirement on community safety 
partnerships to develop and implement strategies to address crime and 
disorder in their area. The fire service however where not included until the 
3rd amendment of the Act. The Act provides an ideal opportunity for the police, 
fire services, other agencies and local authorities to develop local initiatives 
and programmes in relation to the investigation and prevention of deliberate 
fires. 
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Reducing the number of fires set by arsonists can be approached in a number of 
different ways. 
1. Identify the people committing arson. 
2. Catch the arsonists quickly 
3. Deal with the arsonist in the most appropriate way 
 
Reducing the number of fires in the high-risk properties can also be achieved in a 
number of different ways. 
1. Design the properties to reduce the potential for arson. 
2. Identify those properties most likely to be targeted  
3. Target those properties with advice and support. 
 
As of June 2001 the Fire Service is longer part of the Home Office rather it is 
covered by the newly created Department of Transport, Local Government and 
Regions. How this will affect the fire service in general as well as research and 
initiatives to combat arson are not yet known only time will tell. 
 
Youth Disorder 
 
Over recent year‟s fire brigades have been increasing their efforts and directing extra 
resources to the issue of firesetting by juveniles. Currently more than three quarters of 
brigades are running some form of firesetting intervention/education programmes to 
address the significant problem of juvenile setting deliberate fires. However these 
programmes come in many forms and to varying degrees of complexity. 
At present schemes in the UK fall into four categories. 
1. Schemes that follow the Merseyside, Fire Awareness Child Education (FACE) 
used by around 16% of fire brigades. Focus on education 
2. Scheme advocated by Muckley used by around 33% of fire briagdes. Focus is on 
counselling. 
3. In-house schemes developed internally within a brigade. Key elements of the 
scheme vary between each brigade. 
4. Combination schemes. Elements of FACE programme and Muckley scheme with 
some in-house adaptations the mix varies from scheme to scheme. 
 
FACE was established in 1988, this approach aims to educate children who play with 
fire. The FACE pack is aimed at children aged 4-12 years and involves the family 
unit. It aims to change a child‟s attitude towards fire. Preliminary advice is given to 
the parent or carer by phone on fire safety precautions. A home visit is carried out by 
a “fire friend” who talks with the child about the frightening power of fire. The child 
is then given projects to complete which have been designed to promote awareness of 
fire safety issues. This scheme stresses the importance of developing a multi-agency 
network to deal with this problem. Therefore built into the FACE programme is a 
network system, which consists of other professional bodies. If children persist in 
their firesetting behaviour they may be referred to more appropriate agencies such as 
social services or mental health services. The fire brigades themselves can not tackle 
the problem on their own, but can provide an effective education programme in 
conjunction with other organisations (Braodhurst1999). 
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Andrew Muckley an education psychologist designed a resource and training manual 
in 1997 for fire brigades wanting to set up firesetter programmes. Training courses are 
provided for staff, involved in the scheme, to be used in conjunction with the manual. 
The scheme encourages the brigades to determine the type of firesetter being referred 
before deciding which intervention response should occur. The manual provides a 
descriptive typology of firesetters including behavioural characteristics, behavioural 
problems as well as which intervention response is most appropriate for each of the 
different types of firesetter.  Intervention varies therefore on the classification of the 
child.  
 
Kent and Medway fire brigade, have had a designated fire setters team since April 
1999. They have produced a Firesetters Resource Ladder, which combines the type of 
referral with the type of intervention deemed appropriate. 
 
   Picture of ladder goes here 
 
 
 
 
Following the introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 agencies are required 
to ensure that appropriate youth justice services are available for children and young 
people aged 10-17 years who offend or are accused of offending.  
As part of the Governments youth justice reforms the Sunderland youth offending 
service established a multi-stranded strategy that would reduce offending by young 
people with a history of firesetting. The project includes fire safety education 
programmes, structured work experience courses for young offenders aged 15-16 and 
a Princes Trust Franchise targeting unemployed and employed young people aged 17-
25. As well as diversionary initiatives intended to divert young people away from 
firesetting by providing them with various incentives. 
 
The FACE UP, arson programme for young offenders was established in 1991 by 
Merseyside fire service and Liverpool‟s youth justice department, when it was 
realised that there were no community alternatives to offer the courts in cases 
involving arson by juveniles. The course aims to confront, challenge and change the 
offenders misguided negative attitudes that motivate the acts of arson. The 
programme is intensive and is designed as an alternative to custody for juveniles aged 
10-17 years. Participants are expected to attend 2 hr sessions each week for 13 weeks 
as well as completing home study exercises, none compliance could end in custodial 
sentence. The course combines hard-hitting videos about the results of arson with fire 
safety education in an effort to make arsonists realise the full consequences of their 
actions. A social worker or probation officer is present at each of the sessions. The 
scheme is being formally evaluated using the crimogenic scale, which measures the 
offenders‟ attitude to the offence. To date none of the arsonists that have completed 
the course have re-offended. This relies however on court officers informing the 
programme that an individual has re-offended.  
This alternative to custody is not only much cheaper but is a real investment in the 
young people concerned. This course gives the juveniles greater self-esteem, sense of 
pride, purpose, sense of achievement and not only gives them respect for themselves, 
but also for other people in their community (Broadhurst 1999).  
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The development of all these schemes has proceeded without any central guidance 
from either the Home Office or HM Inspectorate of Fire Services resulting in the 
choice of scheme to be applied by a brigade based on limited information, decisions 
tending to reflect experiences of the fire officers involved. Graham Meldrum, Chief 
Inspector of the Fire Service, at a conference given in June 2001 acknowledged that 
some schemes are too complicated, too psychological in approach and outside the 
normal duties of a fire officer.   
 
As these programmes are working with potentially vulnerable juveniles it is vital that 
selection, screening and training of the staff involved be rigorous. Follow up data on 
the juveniles should also be maintained in order to evaluate the relative success of 
these schemes. Currently although many brigades claim very high levels of success 
there is at present very little empirical evidence in their support. 
 
 
 
The Home Office in collaboration with the Arson Control Forum is currently 
developing a module of the National Community Fire Safety Toolbox that will 
provide detailed guidance for brigades on all issues relating to juvenile firesetter 
intervention. This module will provide information on the models currently being 
used by the fire service, giving examples of good practice. It will stress the 
importance of close liaison and partnership working with other agencies. The module 
will also assist brigades to develop criteria for staff selection, training and identify the 
relevant child protection issues. It will also give information about data collection and 
evaluation methodologies. It is hoped that the module will be available to fire 
brigades early in 2002, (Arson Prevention Bureau 2001). 
 
Malicious  
 
Despite the fact that malicious fires represent a significant proportion of deliberate 
fires. There are currently very few treatment programmes for arsonists within the 
prison system.  
In 1998 HMP Liverpool was the venue for the first ever arson programme run within 
a prison. FACE UP a safety education programme was not aimed specifically at 
convicted arsonists but also hoped to reduce the risk of fire within the prison as a 
whole. Deliberate fires within prisons can cause a great deal of disruption as well as 
endangering the lives of both inmates and staff. The programme was devised and run 
by Steve Broadhurst, Merseyside Fire Service, and was adapted from the FACE 
programme and the Arson Programme run for young offenders. The format was 
similar to that used with young offenders but used stronger more adult material as 
well as relying more on group sessions. The group attends a two-hour session every 
week over a period of 13 weeks. By monitoring re-offences over the next few years it 
may be possible to evaluate the programme. StnO Broadhurst hopes to produce 
formal documentation to support the programme so that the schemes can be extended 
and adopted nationally by the prison service. 
 
HMP Liverpool provide a voluntary pre-release course a fire safety awareness module 
is an integral part of the two week course. The aims of the module enable each 
participant to: - 
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 Understanding the positive and negative aspects of fire.  View video material demonstrating the tragic loss of life in fires.  The components of an fire action plan  The dangers of children being allowed access to cigarette lighters and matches  The aftermath of fire and effects upon immediate family. Damage to property, 
communities, business and commerce.  Prisoners moral response for their personal safety, that of other inmates and prison 
staff.  Promote to prisoners who reside within Merseyside that they can take advantage 
of Merseyside Fire Service home fire safety check and smoke alarm campaigns 
for their families.  Prisoners are advised of the facility of the FACE programme for possible referral 
There has been a reduction of 25% of incidents related to fire within the prison. The 
individual upon release will also hopefully have a change of attitude towards fire and 
fire safety. 
 
Recently in HMP Liverpool the Prison Service has introduced a Drug Support & 
Resettlement programme. This programme is conducted over a period of twenty 
weeks. It is designed to improve the prisoners‟ educational and social skills, to enable 
them to adapt and function in a normal society. The fire safety module described 
above has been introduced as a component of this programme. 
 
 
Operation Lomond, an innovative partnership between Merseyside fire service and 
Merseyside police was established within an area of Liverpool after problems with a 
suspected arsonist. 12 incidents of fire, which had been deliberately started, were 
evidentially, albeit tenuously in most instances, to one individual. The issue of 
securing a successful prosecution was considered however it was realised that due to 
the lack of any form of tangible evidence, another approach would have to be 
formulated. 
A multi-agency approach was required to address this issue. A meeting was therefore 
arranged with the following agencies: social services, probation services and housing 
associations. The purpose of the meeting was to tackle the problem of the suspected 
arsonist as well as informing the agencies of the general implications for all 
concerned in a positive solution was not found.  
The background of the individual was discussed and the catalyst for his offending 
behaviour was established. A problem-solving theme was adopted and all agencies 
offered tangible solutions. To date no more malicious incidents of fire have occurred 
within the individuals immediate vicinity.  
This initiative is a path-finding piece of joint agency work with commitment from all 
interested parties to find workable innovative solutions to the problem of this specific 
individual.  
Station Officer and Detective Sergeant Forrest feel that this initiative has 
demonstrated best practice and should form the template for future parnership 
working for all relevant agencies and authorities, in particular the police and fire 
service. 
This template may also be utilised for suspected/known arsonists from the other 
categories 
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The fact that many malicious arsonists are choosing to use arson as a weapon of 
retaliation indicates that they may lack normal coping skills. The following models 
may be therefore be of use when dealing with malicious arsonists.  
Jackson, Glass & Hope (1987) Social Integration model can be used to enable the 
individual to develop more appropriate and successful methods of controlling and 
influencing their environment. This often includes development of the skills necessary 
for social integration. Individuals may be encouraged to engage in social, academic 
and vocational activities. This hopefully will increase the arsonists self esteem and in 
turn can lead to the individual establishing satisfactory and rewarding relationships. 
Training involves the use of appropriate assertive aggressive behaviour in order to 
promote successful conflict resolution. 
Stewart (1993) recommends the use of the Relapse Prevention model. This enables 
individuals to comprehend their offence cycle, developing an understanding of the 
emotional, cognitive and situational antecedents to their offence. Treatment can then 
target coping behaviour, such as avoidance of high-risk situations, relaxation, 
assertiveness and cognitive restructuring.   
 
 
Emotional Expression 
 
Very little has been written about the treatment of firesetting despite re-offending 
rates for this type of offender being high. This type of arsonist require a psychiatric 
assessment. On the basis of  this thorough assessment, an attempt can be made to 
determine the extent to which firesetting is driven by a mental disorder. If the 
firesetter is mentally ill, then in patient hospital treatment may be necessary. 
Depending on the degree of risk posed by the arsonist, treatment may be in a 
maximum security, medium security or an open psychiatric unit. Treatment should 
consist of the appropriate anti-psychotic or mood stabilising medication, together with 
psychological and social interventions as relevant. 
 
The social integration model and the relapse prevention model mentioned as being 
relevant for malicious arsonists are also relevant for this type of arsonist. 
 
The Aquarius project for the rehabilitation of child arsonists who are categorised as 
being emotionally and behaviourally disturbed has a encouragingly high success rate 
for children in this category. MORE HERE  
 
Their are a number of problems in accommodating arsonists within the community for 
understandable reasons. Glen Davies speaking at a conference given by the arson 
prevention bureau in October 1999, suggested there were three steps towards 
successfully accommodating potentially dangerous people, 
 Thorough assessment of the person‟s accommodation and support needs 
 Knowledge of, and assessment of, the accommodation availability; 
 A fall back place for when it all goes wrong. 
 
Mentally disordered firesetters often feel rejected by and alienated from mental health 
and social services this coupled with their general feelings of social isolation means 
that they require long term commitment provided by adequate psychiatric services. 
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Assessment of the individual should include an attempt to understand the emotional, 
cognitive and situational antecedents to the firesetting. Treatment should then include 
developing coping strategies. 
 
Northgate Hospital Firesetters Programme 
Commenced on a pilot basis, with both male and females arsonists in January 2000. 
Sessions were delivered by psychology and nursing staff, following a structured 92-
page treatment manual compiled by the psychology department. 51 patients were 
identified, among the Northgate forensic population, as having arson as an index 
offence, a pre conviction for arson or firesetting was an area of clinical concern. The 
programme is divided into seven modules, delivered over an estimated 43 sessions. 
The group based treatment programme is based upon Jackson, Glass & Hope 1987 
One Viable Option Theory, in which arson is viewed as a maladaptive and short term 
approach to problem solving allowing the individual to attain control over their 
environment, which they deem to be unobtainable by more conventional means. 
The broad aims of the programme are for group members to: 
1. improve self-esteem and personal effectiveness 
2. consider the functions served by their fire-setting 
3. explore attitudes to fire-setting and potential victims 
4. receive education regarding the potential effects of fires 
5. learn alternative coping strategies to avoid re-offending. 
Patients are assessed on a range of measures and clinical interviews at both the pre 
and post programme scales. Initial results from 10 patients appear encouraging 
however this is of course a small sample. Further information from evaluative data 
will be deseminated in due course. In the longer term Northgate hospital are 
currently discussing plans to obtain follow-up assessment data-thereby enabling 
some indication of the robustness of any treatment gains. 
A total of 10 patients have recently completed separate male (n=4) and female (n=6) 
groups.  
 
Rampton Hospital a high security mental hospital has also developed a treatment 
programme for adult pathological fire setters. The progamme has been developed 
also been developed from Jackson, Glass & Hope 1987 model for adult recidivistic 
arsonists. The programme is also influenced by the dynamic-behavioural model of 
firesetting, Fineman 1995. Each core therapy group contains a maximum of 10 
patients which meets weekly for 16 months. This is underpinned by regular one to 
one sessions. The groups mixed gender and mixed diagnoses. The programme goals 
are to: - 
 Analyse the functional qualities of firesetting episodes 
 Identify the clinical needs of the firesetter 
 Deliver appropriate treatment initiatives  
 Promote robust and appropriate coping strategies 
 Develop appropriate relapse prevention strategies 
 Evaluate potential risk of relapse 
Rampton Hospital carry out a number of psychometric tests the results of which are 
entered onto a database which includes information such as family circumstances, 
psychiatric history, offence history and fire profile as well as each individuals 
current status. As this database expands it will become a invaluable source of 
information and data which can highlight any patterns and also improve the therapy. 
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The description and systematic evaluation of treatment programmes appears to be 
lacking. Indeed the absence of suitable treatment and accommodation for this type of 
arsonist has meant that they currently might often be placed in restrictive custody 
which offer these vulnerable individuals little opportunity for personal development, 
as well as bringing them into contact with threatening and aggressive others. 
Individuals are then released from prison untreated, resulting in a high likelihood of 
recidivism. 
 
What is needed 
 Psychometrically reliable and valid measures of behaviours related to firesetting 
need to be improved. 
 Group and individual methods of treatment need to be devised and evaluated, 
with information disseminated. 
 Sufficient accommodation made available in general hospitals and secure 
hospitals to avoid the need for such people to be imprisoned.  
 More specialist help made available for the treatment of arsonists released into 
the community. 
 
Criminal 
 
There are only a few dedicated fire investigation teams, West Yorkshire, West 
Midlands, Strathclyde, London and Merseyside. Elsewhere there is sometimes 
confusion over who carries out the investigation as the fire service do not have a 
statutory duty to investigate fires. With increasing demands on already stretched 
budgets has led in some brigades to reduce non-statutory work such as fire 
investigation.  Failure to investigate all fires in detail gives a clear signal to arsonists 
that this crime is easy to get away with as does the failure to prosecute and secure 
convictions when the evidence is strong. It is an unfortunate fact that the detection 
and conviction rates for arson are low in comparison with many other crimes. There 
must be a move towards better fire investigation training, leading to greater expertise 
and ultimately, accreditation for the investigator, (Munday 2000). This will increase 
the likelihood of detection and punishment this alone will have the needed deterrent 
effect upon arsonists in general but especially this type of arsonists. 
 
In the West End of Newcastle, where the first arson task force was set up, 
every FDR-1 fire which has been classified as malicious by the fire crew attending is 
followed up and investigated by the arson task force. Investigations are carried out 
jointly by the police and fire service using high profile marked vehicles. As part of 
each investigation neighbours will be visited and questioned. The detective will then 
follow up any information given by local people or acquired at the fire scene. Where 
arrests have been made and prosecutions brought, these have been made as high 
profile as possible using the local media. This has enabled the task force to attract 
widespread and comprehensive media coverage and publicity for its work. Twenty 
prosecutions have taken place in the first six months. The actual number of fires has 
been reduced by 20% and the number of fires in derelict buildings has been reduced 
by 50%. This approach is an important turning point for the fire service. Task forces 
are now being set up around the country.  
 
Various fire brigades within the UK use the services of a hydrocarbon detector dog 
team. There now is a national certification course run by the fire services college. This 
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certification is renewed annually, and ensures a consistent standard of competence for 
fire service dog teams. These dogs are an invaluable tool in speeding up fire 
investigations as the dogs are able to pinpoint exactly where the accelerant is to be 
found. 
 
 Insurance companies can exert influence over the type of arsonist in this category 
who commit arson for profit. Some steps have been taken to reduce arson fraud, 
databases have been set up and the Association of British Insurers is giving guidance 
to insurers. The insurance companies can be effective firstly at the underwriting stage 
of a new policy proposal and then at the investigation phase of a suspicious claim. A 
proper risk assessment should be carried out into the customer to establish whether 
that person has made a previous claim and what is their business history. In order to 
identify the fraud a detailed investigation in to the circumstances and movements of 
the insured and their associates is necessary. 
 
The arson prevention bureau has encouraged a more proactive role resulting in many 
insurers taking a more robust line and training staff in the relevant issues.  
Consideration might also be given to the addition of a policy clause specifying the 
insurers right to reduce or refuse a claim where indications of a link between arson 
and the insured exist and cannot be explained by the insured, Clarke 1996. 
A common database should make it possible to obtain reliable claims history 
identifying previous claims. This would be an important weapon in detecting and 
investigating arson, it would also contribute to identifying the extent of fraud and 
highlight when there are local epidemics of frauds. As levels of information are 
crucial to evaluating and resisting a claim progress could be made by designating fire 
and fraud liaison officers to act as sources of information for insurers. 
Interventions involving the target of arson 
 
A senior consultant of the Fire Protection Association, Mr. Lewis, at a conference 
given in Manchester 1999, drew attention to several precautions, which could be 
taken to avoid arson (Lynch 1999). 
 Step one- “identifying the vulnerability of a building and the internal and external 
security measures.” 
 Step two- “identifying hazards and the sources of ignition available” 
 Step three- “identifying potential firesetters” 
 Step four- “Reducing risk by eliminating and avoiding arson”  
 Step five-“Considering whether security systems are adequate” 
 
Government 
Fire Precautions (workplace) Regulations, 1997 came into force on the 1st December 
1997. The regulations are based upon self-compliance, with emphasis being placed on 
the employer‟s own assessment risk. The fire authority is the enforcing authority. 
These Regulations apply to all employers and place a duty upon them to assess the 
risks of fire and the effect it would have on staff. 
 
Recent changes to Building Regulations Approved Document B concern the provision 
of sprinklers in large single storey uncompartmented buildings, with the requirement 
for sprinklers to be placed in certain buildings with a floor area of 2000 square metres 
or over. (London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority 2000) 
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The Government can produce regulations that improve the way buildings are built and 
protected.  
 
Local Education Authorities 
Schools seemed to have one of the highest risks of arson of any type of property in the 
UK. Results have showed that nearly one in eight schools experience arson or 
suspected arson in one year (Burrows et al 1996). There is also a strong relationship 
between victimisation through arson and victimisation through damage and burglary.  
The implications are that schools, which suffer from damage or from burglary, should 
also think seriously about their precautions against arson. 
Some Local Education Authorities, especially those in high-risk areas, have tried to 
develop special school designs to prevent arson. Innovations have included the 
following features.  A plan form that avoids re-entrant angles, thus denying offenders areas in which 
they may loiter unnoticed.  Metal shutters to secure windows out of school hours, the shutters being locked 
from the inside.  Metal shutters over doors, which are also protected with anti-ram-raid style 
railings  Enclosed rainwater down pipes thus eliminating climbing aids to roof level.  Security lighting incorporated into wide eaves  External walls which are easily cleanable and do no invite graffiti.  Non-climable perimeter fences  
However design solutions need to be functional for educational purposes and take into 
account educational objectives of openness and community involvement (Burrows et 
al 1996).  
 
The prevention of arson attacks fall into a logical process, (APB, 1998): - 
1. Deter unauthorised entry onto the site.  
 By the use of signs and by using fences and hedges. 
  Good lighting is recommended as most vandalism and arson attacks occur outside 
school hours and often at night.  
 Patrols made by either commercial or local authority security teams can be 
effective in deterring would be arsonists. 
2. Prevent unauthorised entry into the building.  
 The number of doors and windows out of view from the public should be kept to a 
minimum.  
 All external doors should be fitted with approved locks.  
 Doorframe construction should be of good quality to resist forcing.  
 Intruder alarms should be fitted and if possible connected to a call-monitoring 
centre. 
 Schools should foster relationships with neighbours who are able to observe out-of 
hour‟s activity on the premises. 
 The installation of CCTV should be considered despite their high cost as they have 
a high deterrent effect. 
3. Reduce the opportunity for an offender to start a fire 
If an arsonist intent on causing damage is unable to enter the premises then the 
opportunity to light a fire outside the building is often exploited. It is important that 
the opportunity to ignite combustible material is eliminated.  
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 Refuse containers should ideally be placed in a secure compound or secured to a 
post no less than 8 meters from the building to prevent them being moved against 
the building. 
 Recycling bins should be located at least 8 metres from the building in secure 
compounds and collections should be made regularly to avoid a build up. 
 Sheds and storage facilities should be sited at least 8 metres away form the main 
building. This will avoid fire spread from such buildings involving the whole 
school. 
4.  Reduce the scope for potential fire damage 
Should a fire be started, either deliberately or accidentally, it is important that its 
effect is minimised by containing the fire to a limited area, or ensuring high value 
contents are protected. 
 Equipment of high value should ideally be located in a secure separate room 
where it will be out of sight and better protected in a fire. 
 Early warning of the outbreak of fire can significantly reduce the losses if early 
firefighting can be initiated. An automatic fire detection system can mean the 
difference between containing the fire to the compartment of origin and the loss of 
the whole building and contents. To be effective the alarm must give warning off-
site. 
 Sprinkler systems are rare in existing schools but increasingly being fitted in new 
schools. Sprinkler systems are best regarded as a combined detection and 
extinguishing system. There is currently a national campaign promoting the use of 
sprinklers in school buildings. This is important in existing schools that are 
recognised as high risk. 
5.  Reduce subsequent losses and disruption resulting from a fire. 
 Recognition should be given to the provision of the most appropriate form of 
extinguishing medium. 
 Members of staff should be adequately trained in fire procedures, including how 
to summon the fire service, building evacuation and the use of fire extinguishers.  
 A service recovery plan should be formulated in advance with the assistance of the 
LEA‟s Risk Management Group where this exists, or with the Local Education 
Authority. 
These measures can help reduce crime within schools as well as combat arson. These 
measures may also be utilised in other types of buildings. 
Given the apparent involvement of pupils and local youths in school arson attacks, 
many attacks being an extension of vandalism and general anti-social behaviour. 
Then training and preventative education in schools about the risk of fire ought to be 
given high priority.  
At present there are problems with the costs and benefits of crime and fire prevention 
in schools. There is split financial responsibility between local Education Authorities 
and school governors. The authority is responsible for the building and major repairs, 
the governors are responsible for minor repairs, decoration and contents. Governors 
may be more worried about burglary than arson, because the former is more likely 
and its costs fall more directly on them. School principles, moreover, typically say 
that they can‟t afford to spend large sums on crime prevention (Burrows et al 1996).  
 
Local Authorities 
Schools, unoccupied buildings, community centres and communal areas are especially 
vulnerable to arson attacks. Local authorities need to realise that if basic 
housekeeping rules such as collecting litter are not followed, the next demonstration 
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will be graffiti. If litter is left there is a good chance that graffiti will not be dealt with. 
A pattern starts to emerge; in the next phase the area starts to be used for unauthorised 
purposes. If the progression continues the next event will be burglary of the premises. 
The more that burglary occurs the higher the chances of minor fires. If this sequence 
escalates almost inevitably the premises become a frequent target for arsonists. If this 
“slide to ashes” pattern can be identified early on there is the possibility of 
intervention action, which can be taken to prevent further escalation of the problem.   
 
Several protocols have been established between the local authorities, fire services 
and police that appear to have had a significant impact on arson reduction. These 
include: - 
 Removal of refuse 
 Securing of void properties 
 Rapid recovery of abandoned vehicles 
There is no reason why these protocols cannot be utilised in other areas of the UK, 
which have similar arson problems. This is an issue, which the Local Government 
Association should consider. 
 
The Zero-tolerance campaign and removal of refuse 
The City of Newcastle designed a campaign to address the problem of household 
refuse in the streets and back lanes of the West End. This initiative was primarily 
aimed at improving the areas appearance however it was soon realised that removing 
rubbish from the streets had a beneficial effect on the rate of arson, especially on the 
number of secondary fires. The zero tolerance campaign encouraged people to put 
their rubbish out only on designated days, rather than letting it accumulate throughout 
the week in the street sand back lanes. Council officers carry out frequent random 
trawls of the area and any individuals who continue to dump rubbish in the area are 
prosecuted. These prosecutions and fines are given as much press coverage as 
possible.  The successful liaison between the arson task force and the refuse 
department now means that the refuse department will remove straight away any 
bulky refuse which the task force considers to be a fire risk to life or property. 
  
Securing of void properties 
The number of arson fires taking place within empty, unsecured properties is a 
significant problem in areas throughout the UK. Not only do they represent a 
significant financial burden on Local Authorities who must eventually either refurbish 
or demolish the building, they also present great risk of death or injury to the 
arsonists, members of the public and the firefighters who attend the fire.  
An excellent scheme was established between the arson task force and Newcastle City 
Council Environmental Health Department. In order to prevent void properties being 
targets for arson attacks the scheme aims to get properties secured quickly and 
effectively. A system was set up whereby unsecured properties were reported to the 
arson task force who then arranges for Environmental Health to have the property 
boarded up. This is done regardless of whether the property is council or privately 
owned. The cost of boarding the house if privately owned is recouped from the 
owners, via the courts if necessary. In addition any property in which a fire has taken 
place is immediately secured. Void properties are therefore secure and access made 
difficult for all but the most determined firesetters.  
The Void properties represent a further danger in that services such as gas and 
electricity may still be connected. The arson task force in Newcastle has been able to 
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liase effectively with Transco and with Northern Electric in order to have gas and 
electricity supplies to vacant premises to be cut off before they can present a danger to 
the public (Marsh 2000) 
 
Abandoned Vehicles 
A number of schemes operate nationally to ensure the rapid removal of found stolen 
and abandoned vehicles. This action is to prevent the vehicles becoming targets for 
vandalism and arson attacks. As it is recognised that while about some vehicles are 
burnt by their original thieves, a large amount are being abandoned by the original 
thieves and burned out later by vandals. The Local Government Association are 
currently developing a “Good Practice Guide” to help authorities reduce the number 
of abandoned vehicles in their area. 
On problem with dealing with abandoned vehicles is that the registered keeper must 
be tracked down via the DVLA and notified. There is a 28-day waiting period 
required before a vehicle may be removed from the street, once the notice is served by 
way of sticking a removal notice to the vehicle. However Local Authorities have the 
power to remove vehicles in seven days, and in some cases 24 hours, if deemed a 
danger to life and property, and are on council land. The results of this are that 
vehicles are removed before the vandals are able to set them alight, reducing the 
number of arson attacks on vehicles. The cost of removing vehicles and impounding 
them however is very significant therefore adequate funding arrangements are 
required.  
 
Kent County Council, Kent County Constabulary, Medway Council, Kent Fire 
Brigade and DVLA established a pilot scheme in January 2001 to remove and destroy 
abandoned/untaxed vehicles. Operation Cubit, as it is entitled, utilises the DVLA 
powers to remove untaxed vehicles in an effort to reduce the number of abandoned 
and apparently abandoned vehicles that may become targets for offenders.  
 
Building design 
Architects have the earliest contribution to make, by incorporating measures at the 
design stage of new buildings or in renewal of existing ones, which in themselves can 
play a vital part in eliminating the opportunities for arson. 
 
Secured by design is an UK police initiative supporting the principles of designing out 
crime. It has a number of key features.  Secured by design is the corporate title for a family of national police projects 
involving the design for new homes, refurbished homes, commercial premises and 
car parks.  It is primarily an initiative to encourage the building industry to adopt crime 
prevention measures to assist in reducing the opportunity for crime, creating a 
safer and more secure environment.  Secured by design is supported and managed by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) and has the backing of the Home Office. It has been drawn up in 
consultation with the Department for Transport, Local Government as Regions as 
well as trade, industry and standards organisations.  Secured by design does not guarantee that a particular area will be crime proof. 
But it indicates that the site has been subject to a design process and improved 
level of security, which in the experience of the police service and other agencies 
have shown to significantly reduce the risk of crime, including arson. 
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Individual Companies and Organisations  
Owners of businesses can manage and reduce the likelihood of arson in a number of 
ways. Woodward and Kidd (1992) provide a useful overview. 
 proper risk assessment 
 good physical security measures against external arsonists 
 proper screening of personnel to prevent internal arson 
 good internal controls including housekeeping and proper investigation of all fires 
 physical design of buildings to minimise risk and impact of arson 
 good levels of physical fire safety-detection, sprinklers and staff training. 
 
The Arson Prevention Bureau published a leaflet, Prevention and control of arson in 
Industrial commercial premises in September 2000, in which they advise that 
companies should have a management plan to combat arson which includes: - 
1. The arson risk assessment 
2. Security measures 
3. Passive and active fire protection measures 
4. Fire safety management procedures. 
 
An arson risk assessment should be carried out as part of the Fire Precautions 
(Workplace) Regulations 1997, as amended in 1999. There are many ways to carry 
out a arson risk assessment. The assessment should involve considering the features 
related to the occurrence or arson in a logical and structured manner.  
Effective security measures make a positive contribution to reducing the threat of 
arson these include 
 Perimeter protection-priority should be given to keeping intruders out 
 Access control-to detect intruders 
 Security Lighting and automatic fire detection system.   
 CCTV systems which has a high deterrent effect. 
 Training of staff enabling them to be alert of possibility of arson and what to do if 
an arson attack should occur. 
Measures can also be taken to reduce the effects of deliberately started fire. Passive 
fire protection is based on the principle of containment. Therefore if a fire should 
occur it will be restricted to one area of the building. Active fire protection involves 
installing systems that either detect and/or extinguish the fire. 
Fire safety management factors need to be considered separately for each organisation 
as it depends on the premises they occupy and the nature of their business. These 
factors tend to be hinge around staff relations and an effective fire safety training 
regime. 
 
Occupiers of Dwellings 
Can take a number of steps to deal with the threat of arson. 
 ensure their home is secure with adequate locks on doors and windows 
 ensure common areas have satisfactory security and are well lit. 
 minimise the amount of combustible materials left in and around the building 
 occupiers should consider setting up a neighbourhood watch scheme 
 ensure home safety measures such as the fitting of smoke alarms and having an 
escape plan in the event of fire are in place.  
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Merseyside Fire service has introduced a 5-year startegy plan. One of the aims of this 
plan is to reduce the number of dwelling fires by a third in 5 years. They are currently 
carrying out 6,000, Merseyside fire service home fire safety check and smoke alarm 
installations, a month. 
 
Owners of Vehicles 
Protecting your vehicle from arsonists is very closely linked to securing the vehicle 
against theft. One in 12 vehicles that are reported stolen are set alight (FPA 1999). 
The Arson Prevention Bureau has produced a leaflet, Car fires; the growing problem 
and how to help extinguish it. It provides the following advice to motorists to help 
them reduce the risk of their car being stolen and subsequently being set alight: - 
 Where to leave your car 
 Remove the ignition key 
 Close all the windows 
 Fit and use an anti-theft device 
 Always lock the door and boot 
 Hide property 
 Report abandoned cars to the police. 
 
 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Police counting rules for offences 
Statistics held by the police and fire services will also differ due to the way in which the police 
record offences under their Counting Rules, for example, 
e.g. (i) Burnt out vehicles/vehicle theft 
Up until April 1998, deliberate car fires would most likely have been recorded as car thefts or 
TWOC (taken without owners consent) rather than an offence of arson (if the vehicle was 
reported stolen prior to it being found burnt out).  Under the new Police Counting Rules such 
incidents should now be recorded as two separate offences rather than just the one offence of 
theft/TWOC.  However, the recent report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary “On 
the Record” recommended that the counting rules for vehicles burnt out should be changed back, 
to recording just the one offence of theft rather than recording the arson offence as well (unlesss 
there is evidence that the arsonist and vehicle thief are two different sets of offender).   
e.g. (ii) Violent crimes  
Under the principal offence rule – incidents such as people being injured in an arson attack 
would be recorded as “Serious wounding” rather than arson.  Under Police Counting Rules, 
violent offences (apart from summary offences such as common assault) such as “serious 
wounding” should take precedence over non-violent ones, regardless of which one attracts the 
maximum sentence.   
 
 
Definitions and terminology 
Most “deliberate” activity as dealt with by the fire service does not feature in the 
police recorded crime figures.  The fire service record those fires of non-accidental 
origin as either: “malicious”; “deliberate” or “doubtful”.  The Arson Scoping Study 
recommended that this terminology should be reviewed to overcome the problems 
encountered by the fire service with the use of the terms “malicious” and “doubtful”.  
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This surrounds the increasing use of the Fire Damage Report Form (FDR1), the form 
using by all fire brigades to record key information on every fire attended, as 
evidence in court cases, although at the time of the hearing more detailed information 
(such as a Fire Investigation report) is usually available.  The Fire Service are 
becoming more and more reluctant to use the term “malicious” as a means of 
describing the cause of the fire, as this suggests that the fire officer made a judgement 
about the intent of the individual involved.  Fire officers are not considered as expert 
witnesses (unlike Forensic Scientists) and any statements or decisions must be based 
on fact, not opinion.  The term “doubtful” is often interpreted as “don’t 
know/unsure” when in fact, in fire service terminology means that deliberate ignition 
was suspected  
The police record malicious fires as arson as defined by the Criminal Damage 
Act 1971 (sections 1-3).  The Criminal Damage Act has a higher level of proof 
that arson has been committed than is required for a brigade to attribute a fire 
as deliberately started.  The wording of the Criminal Damage Act states that 
“intent” or “recklessness” and the involvement of “property” have to be 
established by the police before an offence of arson can be recorded. The 
definition used by the fire service is based on “reasonable doubt” which requires 
a lower level of evidence than the police.  
 
Samples and forms of analysis   There is a dark figure of arson, as the clear up rate by the police is only 16%.  
   Biased sample of institutionalised firesetters.  Research has tended to focus on children who are resident in care homes or those 
who have been referred for other mental health problems.  Research has tended to small samples  Investigating many different variables to find a predictive cause of firesetting 
rather than understand normal fireplay in children.  Research suggests that an interest in fire is normal and universal at about four 
years of age but little research has investigated this normal fascination with fire by 
children (APB).  Literature on arsonists largely focuses on those in special hospitals and on adults.  Lack of adequate research being carried out in the area.  Small and homogenous samples very few studies have involved non-clinical 
populations.  Limited access to the population as only 16% of arsonists are caught. Arsonists 
are only identified if they are convicted, or brought to the attention of fire service 
or mental health professionals.  
 
 
Problems with the estimates  Only 72% of arson attacks are reported to the police (British Crime Survey 2000)  Existing risk estimates based on incidents reported to fire brigades almost 
certainly underestimate the true level of deliberate fires.  The National Statistics rely on fire officers inferring the arsonists age.   Their may be huge regional variations which are lost due to the use of National 
Statistics.  Only 50% of arson attacks attended by fire service are crimed by the police. 
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 Of those crimed only 16% result in a conviction.  Results of current research are specific to the samples studies and some cases 
location specific.  
 
 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Statistics 
 Introduction of common terminology for describing fires should be introduced 
nationally to avoid any complications in future research. 
 Information contained on local databases should be shared between 
organisations where practical 
 National statistics related to arson need to be improved and consideration 
should be given to updating the FDR-1 form. 
 A common, national database should be established relating to arson activity 
in all of its forms, in order to carry out analyses and identify trends these can 
then be made available to all agencies. This would be a national co-ordination 
of data on both offenders and incidents. The content and structure of the 
database should allow information to be retrieved quickly. Therefore when 
any juvenile or adult is referred to one of the agencies an immediate search 
can be made in order to determine whether this individual has previously 
committed an arson offence. Until there is a centrally co-ordinated system it 
will be impossible to assess the true levels of recidivism. This system would 
allow the identification of individuals who have a history of firesetting 
allowing these people to have continuing supervision with help being provided 
were necessary.  
 
Research 
 A huge research project should be set up to determine the real extent of the 
arson problem and the people who commit it. 
 Research should specifically look at the extent and nature of fraudulent arson. 
 Research should be carried out to determine whether the effectiveness of 
collaboration between the insurance industry, the police and fire service could 
be improved in the case of fraudulent arson. 
 Studies have mainly concentrated on children in care or those with mental 
heath problems. What is needed is research about children from all different 
backgrounds in order to investigate how common or “normal” a phenomenon 
firesetting is in the general population during childhood and adolescence.  
 Research should investigate the most effective method of risk factors or 
predictive factors to be utilised, enabling young people who could be 
considered to be potential arsonists to be identified. 
 Local health authorities should review the facilities they provide for the 
assessment and treatment of arsonists. 
 A comprehensive research programme should examine arsonists in hospitals, 
and investigate matters such as the effects of closing large mental health 
institutions and the existing problems arising from community care. 
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 The reasons why an individuals chose fire, as their weapon of choice needs to 
be addressed in a systematic manner.  
 Research should be carried out into developing for general application a 
system of assessing the arson risk for a property. 
 
Interventions 
 A central information database containing information about current arson 
reduction initiatives should be established. 
 National research should be carried out into devising and implementing 
suitable fire safety educational awareness programmes. 
 Analysis, evaluation and validation of existing initiatives showed be carried 
out by an independent outside organisation in order to examine their 
effectiveness. 
 Effective treatment programmes for arsonists should be established in prisons 
and mental hospitals. 
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